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 “That Could  Happen”: Nature Writing, The Nature Fakers, and  a Rhetoric of Assent  
 
Any good poet, in our age at least, must begin with the scientific view of the world; and any scientist worth 
listening to must be something of a poet, must possess the ability to communicate to the rest of us his sense of love 
and wonder at what his work discovers. 
--Edward Abbey (87) 
 
Much has been made about the relationship between nature writing and  science.  In perhaps the first 
academic look on nature writing, Phillip  Marshall H icks defines it as the “literary expression of 
scientifically accurate observation of the life history of the lower orders of nature, or of other natural 
objects” (6).  We may take issue with some of the minor details in Hicks’ definition, but i f you read  nature 
writing--from Abbey to Zwinger--science is there.  The found ation of the genre is empirical observation 
of the more-than-human world .  That’s not the whole of it, however.  As Jean Arnold  notes: “Nature 
writing [ . . . ] contains this par t of natural knowledge that science cannot fathom, the part that must come 
from human experience, from human self-awareness, from human community structured  through ties to 
the land , and  from the human imagination, acting freely” (22).  Because of the pair ing of empiricism and  
other human experience, readers come to the genre with certain assumptions: they assume the text will 
tell them something independently verifiable about the object world --something they could  see, hear, or 
touch if they were in the same location at the same time.  They assume they are read ing nonfiction, and  
for most readers, that d istinction is important.  Readers also come to nature writing with the hope that the 
writer will use imagination to help them see the world  in a new way and  possibly offer them a d ifferent 
and  better relationship to the more-than-human sphere. 
 If the proceed ing is true, nature writing as a genre is unique, and  we must ask: how should  we 
read  nonfiction nature writing?  How does the nonfiction d istinction cha nge the relationship between the 
writer and  the reader?  The writer and  the world?  The reader and  the world?  Barry Lopez addresses 
these very questions in “Landscape and  Narrative,” an essay found  in Crossing Open Ground.  Here, he 
considers the act of storytelling and  explores how language connects us to landscapes, to animals and  to 
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each other.  Lopez is concerned  not only with the content of the stories and  how they connect us to the 
more-than-human world , but also with how the stories are received .  H e is concerned  with the rhetorical 
stance the listener--or in our case the reader--brings to the experience.  Lopez wants to find  a way to 
expand  notions of knowled ge to include not only the empirical and  quantifiable, but also the personal.  
To this end , he asks us to suspend  initial doubt for initial belief.  To use Wayne Booth’s term, he calls for a 
rhetoric of assent.   
 
I 
 Lopez sets up his d iscussion of assent by relating a story he heard  from the Nunamiut who live 
near the Brooks Range in Alaska.  He heard  the story d uring an informal exchange of hunting and  
trapping tales.  Lopez writes: 
The story I remember most vivid ly was about a man hunting a wolverine from a snow 
machine in the spring.  He followed  the animal’s tracks for several miles over roll ing 
tundra in a certain valley.  Soon he caught sight ahead  of a dark spot on the crest of a hill -
-the wolverine pausing to look back.  The hunter was catching up but each time he came 
over a rise the wolverine was looking back from the next rise, just out  of range.  The 
hunter topped  one more rise and  met the wolverine bounding toward  him.  Before he 
could  pull his rifle from its scabbard , the wolverine flew across the engine cowl and  the 
wind shield , hitting him square in the chest.  The hunter scrambled  h is arms wild ly, 
trying to get the wolverine out of his lap, and  fell over as he d id  so.  The wolverine 
jumped  clear as the snow machine rolled  over, and  fixed  the man with a stare.  He had  
not bitten, not even scratched  the man.  Then the wolverine walked  away. The man 
thought of reaching for the gun, but no, he d id  not.  (62-3) 
 Lopez then sends a copy of this story to a friend  in Canada who works among the Cree people.  
asking him to relate the story to his hosts.  Upon seeing his friend , Lopez asks him a bout the reaction of 
the Cree.  Their response illustrates what is key to Lopez’s theory of understand ing the natural world .  
“You know how they are.” he tells Lopez.  “They said , ‘That could  happen’” (70).  
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 To grasp the importance of these three words, we must first know that the Cree are experts on 
wolverine; their response is not d ivorced  from experience.  They could  have assumed a more skeptical 
stance, doubting until they had  proof of this somewhat sensational and  anthropomorphic account.  
However, the story fits within the realm of their experience and , consequently, they assent to the 
possibility.  They give an initial “yes” to the story of the wolverine.  Lopez argues that the degree of truth 
we are able to d iscern depends upon our willingness to assume the rhetorical stance of the Cree.  He 
insists we will find  the most truth “only when we accord  one another the respect the Cree showed the 
Nunamiut.”  Without such a gesture of respect, he asserts, “there are only failures of imagination: 
reductionism in science; fundamentalism in religion; fascism in politics” (71).   
 The type of respect the Cree show the Nunamiut is the foundation upon which Lopez build s a 
theory of understand ing stories about the natural world . Lopez’s comments on the wolverine sto ry can 
easily be expanded  into theory of read ing nature writing.  When we approach nature writing, we face a 
situation similar to that of the Cree.  We are asked  to judge the possibility of what we are read ing.  
Furthermore, the stories that we read  about the more-than-human world  have ethical implications.  If we 
assent to a story that gets it wrong, we are less likely to find  ethical relationships --we too are likely to get 
it wrong.  Yet if we assent to a story that gets it right, our ability to form ethical relationships to the world  
is enhanced .  In fact, because nature writing often asks us to abandon conventional relationships with the 
natural world  for more ethical ones, our openness to new possibilities, our assent, can have great reward .  
Moreover, Lopez implies--through example of the Cree’s response--an initial yes when presented  with 
new ideas, stories, or arguments, is what allows the possibility for a more ethical response.  The other 
option--an initial no--as Lopez notes, lead s down the path of reductionism, fund amentalism, and  fascism.   
 To see why we must initially assent, we need  to look at the work of Wayne Booth.  In Modern 
Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, like Lopez, Booth claims that a rhetoric of doubt leads down the same 
reductionist, fund amentalist, and  fascist path.  Booth makes the argument for assent at greater length 
than Lopez, and  in doing so insists that, because contemporary thinking has fallen into an extreme 
skepticism which he calls modern dogma, assent is needed .  For an example, Booth points to the 
philosophy of Bertrand  Russell, which he feels clearly demonstrates the excesses of modern d oubt.  For 
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Booth, the conflict lies within Russell’s quest for certain knowled ge and  in his denial of any fact or idea 
that cannot withstand  the rigor of empirical testing.  Such a narrow test would  eliminate many ways of 
knowing the world .  It would  especially eliminate the personal as a legitimate way of understand ing.  
Booth writes: 
Though [Russell] often said  that nothing is certain, h e never gave up the notion that what 
one should  look for, when looking for truth, is the most nearly certain propositions one 
can find  and  certainty was always a function of empirical and  logical proving.  Such a 
search means in practice that most of what we consider important will be unknowable 
because unprovable, and  it also means that belief in the universal efficacy of doubt 
becomes the most certain belief of all.  (58) 
 What is at stake here, if we embrace an extreme skepticism such as Russell’s, is th e abandonment 
of all knowledge that cannot be verified  empirically --the aband onment of most values and  of reasoning 
about those values.  Furthermore, if we ad opt this extreme form of skepticism, we also embrace an initial 
“no” instead  of an initial “yes.”  And, as Booth notes, “The notion that we have reason to believe only 
what has been proved  in the sense of withstand ing all possible doubts, cannot be lived  with by most of us 
for even a moment” (66). 
 I might be accused  of polarizing the possibilities her e.  “Can I not suspend  judgment until I 
receive further evidence?” you might ask.  And  I would  answer, “Yes.”  But in suspending judgment you 
still only have two possibilities.  First, you can suspend  judgment with assent.  In other word s, you can 
suspend  judgment while still granting that the story or argument might be true and  “try on” the 
evidence.  You can say, “I will believe it possible until I have reason to d isbelieve.”  Or you can suspend  
judgment with d oubt.  “Prove it to me,” you may say.  “I will doubt it’s possible until you have 
assembled  sufficient evidence.”  But there are still only two ways to suspend  judgment --with assent or 
with d oubt. 
  In Seeking Awareness in American Nature Writing, Scott Slovic asserts that Lopez’s theory of 
understand ing the world  would  reject the narrowness of extreme doubt.  Accord ing to Slovic, Lopez asks 
us to change our habitual way of thinking: “The specific change [Lopez] calls for is the renewed reliance 
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on personal experience, in add ition to the less subjective and  more quantitative approaches which 
Western civilization, at least since Francis Bacon, has come to esteem most highly” (141).  Lopez asks us 
to value the empirical along with the personal.  Being careful and  watchfu l--being a good  empiricist--is 
something he finds necessary for knowing the world .  But Lopez also recognizes the limits of this 
epistemology and  realizes that it is only when close observation is joined  with other less quantifiable 
epistemological methods--the personal, the mythic, the im aginative--that we truly begin to understand  
what is “out there” and  what our relationship to it is, or more importantly, what it should  be.  Moreover, 
if we are going to extend  our methods of knowing to include the personal with the quantitative, we must 
also approach new ideas and  new stories w ith an initial “yes.”   
 Assent is especially necessary when approaching the p roblem of environmental ethics.  The idea 
of expanding our ethical system beyond  the bounds of humanity is counter to Western trad ition.  We 
have spent millennia in the West with the natural world  as our foe --as something to be conquered , as 
something to be overcome--rather than as something with which to seek harmony.  If we are to overcome 
such a long trad ition of domination, we must be w illing to “try on” the relationships that nature writers 
are creating with the natural world  and  evaluate the “truth” they provide about living in the world .  The 
respect and  openness of the “that could  happen” stance is vital if we are to explore new ways  to live. 
 Assent, however, does not eliminate the need  for useful doubt.  The openness of the Cree’s 
response is not naive accep tance.  We are often confronted  with blatantly false stories.  In the specific case 
of nonfiction nature writing, I would  argue there is a certain contract established  between the reader and  
the writer--a contract that requires clear fidelity to the world .  If we are asked  by writers to accept their 
ethical vision, we must be able to trust their depiction of reality.  Blatantly fa lse stories w ill affect our 
relationship with the more-than-human world  in potentially negative ways.  We must, then, decide when 
to assent and  when to have reason to d oubt.  Both Booth and  Lopez provide useful criteria for such 
d iscrimination.   
 Booth’s major criterion for assent is life experience.  We all come to stories and  arguments w ith 
the experience of other stories and  arguments   that have alread y been proven to be satisfactorily true or 
false.  Accord ingly, Booth writes:  “When I meet, as I d id  last year, a young Forest Service employee who 
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believes that men on earth can project themselves instantaneously to Venus and  back again, I do not 
grant assent pending d isproof; I have no impulse to assent at all, since the claim runs counter to all of my 
experience” (107).  Booth uses an extreme example to make his point; yet, we are usually presented  with 
much more subtle situations.  But we all have life experience to rely upon.  The assent that Booth is 
writing about here--gauged  by life experience--is very similar to the assent Lopez asks us to ad opt.  Lopez 
didn’t have enough experience with either the wolverine or the story telling context, so he relied  on the 
Cree.  Referring to the Cree and  their “that could  happen” response, Lopez writes:  “In thes e 
uncomplicated  words the Cree declared  their own knowledge of the wolverine”(70).  The Cree came to 
the wolverine story with specific life experience, and  even though they had  never seen a wolverine to this 
exact thing, their life experience told  them it was very possible; therefore, they assented . [1] 
 Life experience is also important for Lopez, and  he uses experience to help determine the 
d ifference between what he calls authentic and  inauthentic stories.  Although, in the instance of the 
wolverine he is speaking about a very specific type of story telling, Lopez’s use of the term story is more 
general includ ing nonfiction prose, novel, short story, and  poetry as well as trad itional narrative forms 
such as myth (68).  The touchstone for his authentic/ inauthentic d istinction rests with two “land scapes” --
the interior and  the exterior.  The exterior landscape is “the one we see --not only the line and  color of the 
land  and  its shad ing at d ifferent times of the day, but also its p lants and  animals in season, i ts weather, its 
geology, the record  of its climate and  evolution.”  He then notes: “One learns land scape finally not by 
knowing the name or identity of everything in it, bu t by perceiving the relationships in it --like that 
between the sparrow and  the twig”  (64).   
 The interior landscape is “a kind  of projection within a person of a part of the exterior 
land scape.”  So, accord ing to Lopez, the interior landscape must correlate in some way to what’s “ou t 
there.”  This interior/ exterior relationship is important.  “Relationships in the exterior landscape,” writes 
Lopez, “include those that are named and  d iscernible, such as the nitrogen cycle, or a vertical sequence of 
Ordovician limestone, and  others that are uncodified  or ineffable, such as winter light fall ing on a 
particu lar kind  of granite, or the effect of humid ity on the frequency of a blackpoll warbler’s burst of 
song.”  In other words, the “interior land scape responds to the character and  subtlety of the exterior 
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land scape; the shape of the ind ividual mind is affected  by the land  as it is by genes” (65).  The 
relationship between the interior and  exterior land scape is one of reciprocity between the world  and  the 
ind ividual existing in the world . 
 The idea of interior and  exterior landscape is important because Lopez’s ideas of “authentic” and  
“inau thentic” are rooted  in how these two land scapes correlate.  Although in this example Lopez writes 
about a wild  exterior landscape, the same idea applies to a cityscape or a rural scene.  For Lopez, it is just 
as important that the relationships be authentic in a story about a housing project as one about an alpine 
cirque.  As Lawrence Buell notes about Lopez’s work: “Subjectivity is not a mere function of landscape; 
but it is regu lated  somewhat by land scape, and  as far as Lopez is concerned  land scape is the more 
interesting variable.  In short, Lopez remains accountable to the facticity in terms of which he invites his [ 
. . . ] images to be judged” (94).  For Lopez, the relationship between the interior and  exte rior in the story 
being told  works as a way of determining when to assent, much as life experience does for Booth.  For 
Lopez, stories are theories about the world  coming from the land scape within bu t which must be 
ultimately jud ged  against the landscape w ithout.   
 Lopez’s idea about landscapes takes Booth’s idea of life experience one step further and  applies it 
to the specific problem of our relationship with the natural world .  Lopez is insisting that our life 
experiences occur in specific places and  that those places shape those experiences.  This is not to say that 
land scape determines our experience, but that it offers a certain range of possibilities.  Our experience 
will d iffer greatly in the Arctic from our experience in Manhattan.  There is a d ist inctly d ifferent set of 
possibilities in Utah’s San Rafael Swell than there is in Costa Rica’s San Blas Islands.  Because we are 
concerned  with nature writing here, such a d istinction is vital to our d iscussion.  
 The idea of interior and  exterior landscape calls our attention to the role that the more-than-
human world  plays in our lives.  The very act of bringing attention to the more -than-human has ethical 
implications.  Lopez, at the very least, calls for an awareness that, as Slovic notes, creates a “con dition 
which helps us to act responsibly and  respectfully” (138). [2]   But Lopez goes further; by carefully 
balancing the interior and  the exterior, he creates a necessary reciprocity between the two.  In other 
words, the interior landscape, the landscape of the mind , is never independent of the physical or the 
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exterior landscape.  Likewise, except as mediated  by the interior landscape of the mind , humans can 
never understand  the exterior landscape.  The outer world  shapes the mind  bu t the mind  also shapes  the 
outer world . 
 Through a “that could  happen” approach and  a rhetoric of assent, both Lopez and  Booth are 
attempting to find  a pragmatic theory of understand ing that includes the personal but does not abandon 
the empirical and  quantitative.  They both w ant to expand  what can be considered  “true.”  For example, 
Lopez writes: “Myth, which we tend  to regard  as fictitious or ‘merely metaphorical,’ is as authentic, as 
real, as the story of the wolverine in the man’s lap” (68).  Even though the creator of any narrative--
fictional, factual, or mythic--will always fall short of recreating reality because “perception and  language 
both fail” (69), a story can be authentic if the relationships that are created  within the story are recreated  
with care.  The relationships--between people, between people and  animals, between people and  the 
land scape and  so on--must reflect two things.  First, they must reflect something of reality --some 
connection with the life experience of the hearers and  with the landscape within which the story occurs; 
second , the story must allow the hearer to evaluate the relationships ethically --to ask not only if the 
relationships are connected  in some way to their reality, but also if the relationships are proper.  I am not 
promoting an environmental dogmatism here.  I am seeking something much looser.  To declare a story 
absolutely authentic or inauthentic is, in fact, too black and  white.  Rather, it is a matter of degree and  of 
context. 
 Lopez himself clarifies these ideas in an interview with  Stephen Trimble.  Because truth is such a 
d ifficult thing at which to arrive, and  because truth and  writing are much more complex than an attempt 
at a d irect mimesis, the writer’s responsibility is not to a strict literal truth, or even, says Lopez, “to k now 
the truth, because no one knows the tru th.”  Instead  the writer must “set the story up in such a way that 
truth can be revealed ” (70).  If the relationships are carefully created , the reader can ask that next ethical 
question: “Are these relationships authentic?”  Or more accurately: “How are these relationships 
authentic--to what degree?”  Moreover, if the story is authentic, the relationships will be carefully 
recreated  and  the story will not mislead  its hearer or reader about the range of possibiliti es offered  by the 
place.   
 9 
 The usefulness of the criteria of authentic and  inau thentic as a way of gauging assent depends 
upon the questions we are asking of literature.  If these criteria are used  as a way of evaluating all 
literature, they need  to be used  carefully and  self-consciously so that the critic does the literature justice 
and  does not fall into the trap of the overly simplistic that always dogs ethical criticism.   Still, nature 
writing, the topic we are d iscussing here, is a special case that h as its own special set of assumptions.  
Even though, accord ing to Lopez, fiction and  myth can be considered  authentic by the above criteria, we 
are not focusing on these genres.  Admitted ly, borders between genres are porous, but there is a specific 
contract set up with the reader in nonfiction nature writing.  There is an agreement between the reader 
and  writer; the writer is attempting his or her best to combine empirical observation and  literary art.  
Writer David  Quammen puts it this way:  “I believe in  hold ing nonfiction to a very rigorous standard  of 
factual accuracy.  [ . . . ] If it’s an animal d oing a given thing in a given place, it means that that animal d id  
that thing in that place” (Sumner, “Facts” 9).  Buell agrees with Quammen and  writes that in nature 
writing there must be “a human accountability to the environment” (7).   
If this contract is established  between reader and  writer, the next question seems to be: To what 
degree can a writer interpret and  still maintain an authentic relationship with the animals and  land scapes 
he or she is writing about?  Edward  Abbey, for example, took a degree of literary license in his most 
widely read  book, Desert Solitaire.  The seasonal narrative structure resembles Walden, with Abbey 
starting the book in late winter and  finishing the book as winter is returning.  Yet the events of Desert 
Solitaire took place over three consecutive seasons while he was ranger at Arches National Monument 
(Trimble 8).  In add ition, d uring at least one of those seasons, Abbey ha d  his w ife and  child  living in the 
trailer w ith him, yet they are not mentioned  in the narrative and  their presence would  surely alter the 
huge ethos of Ranger Abbey, the book’s narrator and  protagonist (Edward Abbey). 
 Are Abbey’s omissions forgivable breaches?  A writer who goes even further than Abbey is 
Annie Dillard .  She does not merely omit facts and  condense time--she creates events.  Pilgrim at Tinker 
Creek begins with the story of an old  tomcat: 
I used  to have a cat, an old  fighting tom, who would  jump through the open wind ow by 
my bed  in the middle of the night and  land  on my chest.  I’d  half-awaken.  He’d  stick his 
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skull under my nose and  purr, stinking of urine and  blood .  Some nights he knead ed  my 
bare chest with his front paws, powerfully, arching his back, as if sharpening his claws, 
or pummeling a mother for milk.  And  some mornings I’d  wake in daylight to find  my 
body covered  with paw prints in blood; I looked  as though I’d  been painted  with roses. 
(2) 
 Dillard  has penned  wonderful and  engag ing opening paragraph, but it d id n’t really happen to 
her.  In “Surveying the Boundaries: An Inquiry Into Creative Nonfiction,” Sarah Heekin Redfield  writes: 
“At the 14th Annual Key West Literary Seminar in 1996 [ . . . ] Annie Dillard  casually remarked  th at she 
never actually owned  a tomcat, let alone a tomcat with bloody paws” (40).  Dillard  borrowed this 
experience with permission from a friend , but she d id  not experience it herself.  So is this an unforgivable 
breach of trust with the reader?  Can we no longer trust the narrative because of this fact?  Do we 
approach the text d ifferently now that we know this?  Redfield  continues:  “Several sources confirmed  
that after the aud ience let out a synchronized  gasp, you could  almost hear hearts breaking” (40).    
 When asked  by Redfield , Dan Philippon puts it this way:  “The primary [question], it seems to 
me, [is] whether the writer of nonfiction has a contract with the reader not to present fictionalized  or 
borrowed material as his or her own.  That writers of nonfiction use the techniques of fiction writers is a 
given, but whether they should  use fictional material is another question” (40).  However, the fact that 
hearts were breaking at Key West illustrates how nonfiction creates certain expectations from th e reader, 
and  the contract between the writer and  reader is broken when fictional material is passed  off as fact.  
How often do we find  ourselves saying, “Is this a ‘true’ story?  Did  this really happen?”  Furthermore, 
when the reader find s that things are fabricated , he or she finds it more d ifficult to trust the writer.  Yet, if 
we are to practice a rhetoric of assent toward  the relationships nature writers are asking us to assume 
with the world , we need  to trust the writer. 
 Despite the crafted  d isparity between literary product and  actual event, I would  argue that Desert 
Solitaire qualifies as authentic.  There is an integrity with which Abbey portrays the landscape.  Although 
he self-consciously notes in his introduction that “language makes a mighty loose net with which to go 
fishing for simple facts,” (xii) he carefully sorts out the relationships between himself and  the plants, 
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animals, and  rocks in a way that reflects an empirical reality.  His portrayal of gopher snakes mating, or 
of the color, texture, and  starkness of the redrock just outside the door of his trailer, or of the white frailty 
of the cliffrose, have an element of the scientist.  The selection of details and  the collapsing of time for 
formal effect do not remove the authenticity from the text.  Instead  it creates an effect that is genuine.  It 
reproduces in the reader an intended  feeling for the landscape and  constructs a reasonable theory of 
reality. 
 Dillard  seems to be playing a bit fast and  loose with the reader, and  I ad mit that af ter find ing out 
about the license she takes, I am more reticent to assent to her arguments.  But Pilgrim at Tinker Creek is a 
remarkable book, one of great value, and  although it pushes the edges of the d istinctions we are trying to 
make here, much like Desert Solitaire, there is much to be said  for the other relationships in the book.  And  
for me, the book is still authentic 
 But how far can art impose itself upon a faithful telling of the empirical reality?  Is there a clear 
line where we should  no longer  assent to nature writers because of a breach of the reader/ writer 
contract?  When is the work of a nature writer no longer authentic?   There is an interesting test case of 
which to ask the above questions and  on which to try our criteria.  It is the turn -of-the century case of the 
“Nature Fakers.”   
II 
 Early in the twentieth century, an argument arose between the nation’s most venerable naturalist 
writer, John Burroughs, and  the Rev. William J. Long, also a writer/ naturalist.  The argument took p lace 
in the popular press over the issue of sentimentality and  faithful depiction of natural fact.  It was such a 
tempting controversy at the time that Teddy Roosevelt, himself a naturalist of note and  coiner of the term 
nature fakers, could  not help  entering the fray from the White House. [3] 
 Burroughs and  Long’s argument over the role of art and  fact began in 1902 when William Long 
published  School of the Woods: Some Life Studies of Animal Instinct and Animal Training.  This book was not 
Long’s first; he had  prev iously published  six others.  Yet it was this book that finally expended  
Burroughs's patience.  Shortly thereafter, Burroughs penned  an article for the Atlantic Monthly titled  “Real 
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and  Sham Natural History,” which began a battle in the public press over w hat real nature writing and  
natural history were. 
 The problem for Burroughs was that Long and  several other writers were highly regarded  by the 
public as naturalists--an occupation he took very seriously--and  widely read  by school child ren.  The 
most important problem for Burroughs, however, was that these writers were claiming their observations 
to be nonfiction--to be based  in empirical observation--when in fact Burroughs felt that their writing was 
complete fabrication. Burroughs had  no quarrel with con temporaries who were equally guilty of 
sentimentalism and  anthropomorphism, such as Jack London and  Gene Stratton Porter, because they 
were writing fiction.  But the line between fiction and  fact was crucial for Burroughs, and  Long was 
blurring it.  As Frank Stewart notes in Natural History of Nature Writing: “To Burroughs, Long stood  for 
the nature hacks whose work tarnished  the reputation of serious nature writers such as himself.  In 
Burroughs's opinion, the popularity of ‘skillful frauds’ like Long misled  trusting readers about nature’s 
true meaning, a meaning it was crucial to understand ” (86).   
 Long was not the only writer named in Burroughs’s d iatribe, but Long was his main target and  
the only one to fight back.  In the article, Burroughs attacks Long’s stories with vigor.  One such story is 
of the death of an eagle that Long claims to have witnessed .  The eagle is circling and  screaming at a high 
altitude when, as related  by Burroughs: 
The great bird  set its wings and  came sailing at great speed  str aight toward  the earth, 
passing near the observer [Long], who saw with wond er that the head  with partly closed  
eyes “drooped  forward  as if it were heavy. [ . . . ] Then with rigid  wings he crossed  the 
bay below the point! still slanting gently down to eart h, and  vanished  silently into the 
drooping arms of the dark woods beyond ,” where Mr. Long soon found  him, “his head  
lying across the moss-cushioned  root of an old  ced ar, his wings outstretched  among the 
cool green ferns--dead .” (307) 
 Burroughs then immediately begins to pick apart Long’s story: “Let us see how probable this 
event is: birds d ie as men d o, suddenly, or from lingering d isease and  old  age.  We all know that when [ . 
. . ] caged  eagles d ie of old  age, or other causes, they sicken and  droop for several days, refuse food , and  
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refuse to use their wings, till some morning we find  them dead  under their perches” (307).  He grants that 
it is possible for the eagle to be smitten with “apoplexy in the air.”  But if that were the case, Burroughs 
asks if it would  “come sailing calmly to earth like a boy on a toboggan slide” (307).  
 Burroughs’s critique was scathing and  to the point and , especially at the time, his ethos as a 
naturalist and  writer was practically unimpeachable.  He assumed that his article in the Atlantic Monthly 
would  put an end  to the “fakery” and  that the d iscipline of nature writing had  been justly defended .  But 
in William Long, Burroughs found  a feisty and  articulate opponent who stuck by his claims and  struck 
back with his pen.  Instead  of being cowed by Burroughs, Long published  a carefu lly argued  rebuttal in 
the North American Review.   
 Long’s reply d irectly addresses the matter with which we are concerned  here --when to assent.  I 
have argued  that we cannot function if we reserve our  assent only for verifiable, empirical fact, and  that 
accord ing to both Booth and  Lopez there is a need  for the personal as well as the quantifiable; but, 
especially in the case we are considering here--the case of nature writing--there is a limit to how m uch a 
story can stray from the empirical depiction of the natural world  and  still be authentic.   
 Long’s response depend s on a d ifferentiation between “Science” and  “Nature -study.”  Although 
Long’s depiction of science is a bit of a caricature, the d istin ctions that he d raws, in many ways, are 
reasonable and  resemble those made by Lopez.  Nature study, writes Long, “is a world  of appreciation [ . . 
. ] rather than a world  of description.  It is a world  that must be interpreted  rather than catalogued .”  He 
continues: “This upper world  of appreciation and  suggestion, of ind ividuality interpreted  by 
ind ividuality, is the world  of Nature, the Nature of the poets and  prophets and  thinkers” (688).   
Long recognizes that there are d ifferent types of knowledge, which is an essential tenet in our 
argument for assent. Furthermore, as noted  earlier, what is acceptable in nature writing, or in any 
literature, is not nearly as limited  as what is acceptable in a scientific report.  Even Burroughs agrees with 
this assertion.  In his essay, “Nature and  the Poets,” he writes that the true poet has more insight into 
nature than the naturalist because the poet “carries [nature’s] open secrets in his heart” (Nature 93). [4]  
The stand ards and  expectations for science and  literatu re are d ifferent.  Burroughs seems to be saying 
that literature allows for--even requires--experimentation with perception and  understand ing.  In other 
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words, nature writing is not just a presentation of empirical d ata, but an interpretive project that at tempts 
to create reciprocity between the landscape of the mind  and  the landscape of the world .   
 In his rebuttal, Long argues effectively for his literary view.  He asserts that for nature writing to 
be effective, the author “must not have only sight but vision; not simply eyes and  ears and  a note-book; 
but insight, imagination, and  above all, an intense human sympathy” --an argument similar to Lopez’s.  
Finally, he argues that if the nature writer does not approach his subject with sympathy and  imagination , 
the actions of animals w ill be “the meaningless dance of shadows across the mouth of Plato’s cave” (692 -
93).   
 Long also manages to latch onto the two major weaknesses of Burroughs’s attack.  He writes:  
Aside from the unwarranted  personal attacks [ . . . ] the article has two evident faults that 
destroy the force of his criticism: (1) it overlooks entirely the ind ividuality of animals and  
the ad aptiveness of nature; (2) it weighs the universe with the scales of his own farm and  
barnyard .  What the animals do there is the absolute measure and  limit of what they will 
do in the Maine wilderness and  the Canadian Rockies. (693) 
 Ending with a preacherly ethos, Long warns Burroughs that “there are more things in heaven 
and  earth, and  in the heart of wild  things , evidently, than are seen on Mr. Burroughs’s farm or d reamed 
of in his philosophy” (697). [5] 
 Long’s rebuttal is astute.  The nature writer has more leeway than the scientist; Burroughs may 
be relying too much on the idea of instinct to explain the behav ior of the animals he observes, and  just 
because he has not observed  the phenomenon does not mean that it d id  not occur.   
 As students of literature at the beginning of the twenty -first century rather than the beginning of 
the twentieth, we all recognize the impossibility of exact mimetic fidelity and  are more aware than ever 
that any representation is partial.  Even writers who are attempting accountability to the natural world  
are not willing to restrict themselves to only literal detail.  For example, in her essay “Landscape, History, 
and  the Pueblo Imagination” Leslie Marmon Silko claims “a ‘lifelike’ rendering of an elk is too restrictive” 
because “the detailed  reality of a single creature does not accurately portray ‘Elk’” (266-67).  But I think 
that even Silko would  agree that the reader of her more mythic rendering of an elk would  be conscious of 
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what she is doing as a writer.  This is not to say that a myth is not informed by close observation, but it is 
a d ifferent and  d istingu ishable narrative for m.  The reader would  not expect to run into the mythic elk 
herself.  Instead , when she encountered  an elk, she would  have a cultural and  mythic context w ithin 
which to understand  the encounter. 
 Yet, if we examine Long’s argument more closely, desp ite his claim of sympathy, imagination, 
and  poetic license, he still spends much of the article establishing his own ethos as an experienced  
naturalist and  outdoorsman, and  referring to witnesses that can verify his empirical observations. “For 
over twenty years,” writes Long, “I have gone every season deep into the woods; have lived  alone with 
the animals for months at a time; have followed  them summer and  winter” (691).  Long never aband ons 
the claim that all of his stories are rooted  at some point in empirical observation; therefore, despite his 
interest in literary imagination, he argues that stories must have some sort of accountability to the real.  
Throughout the article, Long never backs off from his claim that all of the stories are rooted , however 
loosely, in some sort of empirical method .  Even when he relates a d ifficult -to-believe story about the nest 
build ing of orioles in his rebuttal, he is very clear about having observed  the behavior he reports.  In 
other words, Long’s d ispute with Burroughs is not over the idea of nature writing being somehow rooted  
in verifiable fact; the d ispute is over the range of acceptable interpretation.  The argument is not over the 
need  for empirical observation in nature literature; the d ispute is over the role of such obs ervation.  The 
d ifference between the two men is the degree of latitud e which each sees as acceptable.  Therefore, to 
discuss the idea of assent further, we need  to look closely two of Long’s stories.   
 The first is a story found  in Long’s North American Review response mentioned  above.  It is about 
a pair of orioles build ing a nest outside his w ind ow.  He uses this story to support his assertion that the 
world’s possibilities are not nearly as limited  as Burroughs would  have us think.  He claims to have f irst 
seen such an event as a boy, but that after twenty years of patient observation, he finally observed  the 
event again.  Long asserts that he observed  the following behavior the spring previous to writing the 
article: 
[The orioles] wanted  a swinging nest [ . . . ] so they fastened  three sticks together on the 
ground  in the form of a perfectly measured  triangle.  At each angle they fastened  one end  
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of a cord , and  carried  the other end  over and  made it fast to the middle of the opposite 
side.  Then they gathered  up the loops and  fastened  them by the middle, all together, to a 
stout bit of marline; and  their staging was all read y.  They carried  up this staging and  
swung it two feet below the middle of a thick limb, so that some leaves above sheltered  
them from sun and  rain; and  upon this swinging stage they built their nest.  The marline 
was tied  once around  the limb, and , to make it perfectly sure, the end  was brought down 
and  fastened  to the supporting cord  with a reversed  double-hitch, the kind  a man uses in 
cinching his sadd le.  Moreover, the birds tied  a single knot at the extreme end  lest the 
marline should  ravel in the wind . (692) 
Furthermore, Long claims the nest hangs currently above his kitchen table.  
 The second  story is one of several about “animal surgery” and  is about a “woodcock genius.”  
This tale comes from an observation Long recalled  from twenty years earlier when he was in his mid -
teens.  Long claims he watched  the woodcock from the opposite side of a stream.  Again I quote the short 
incident in full:   
At first he took soft clay in his bill from the edge of the water and  seemed to be smearing 
it on one leg near the knee.  Then he fluttered  away on one foot for a short d istance and  
seemed to be pulling tiny roots and  fibers of grass, which he  worked  into the clay and  
plastered  it over the fibers, putting on more and  more till I cou ld  plainly see the 
enlargement, working away with strange silent intentness for fully fifteen minutes, while 
I watched  and  wondered , scarce believing my eyes.  Then he stood  perfectly still for a full 
hour under an overhanging sod , where the eye could  with d ifficu lty find  him, his only 
motion meanwhile being an occasional rubbing and  smoothing of the clay band age with 
his bill, until it hardened  enough to suit him, wh ereupon he flu ttered  away from the 
brook and  d isappeared  in the thick woods. (Little Brother 101-106) 
I chose these two stories not because they are particu larly outrageous when compared  to many of 
Long’s other tales, but because they were both printed  after Burroughs’s Atlantic Monthly attack.  The 
story of the oriole nest builders, as noted  above, was printed  in Long’s North American Review rebuttal.  
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The second  story was printed  in a collection called  A Little Brother for the Bear and  appeared  at the end  of 
1903, more than six months after Burroughs’s attack.  Apparently, Long was not at all put off by 
Burroughs. 
 But what do we do with Long’s stories, and  is there harm in assenting to them?  In asking these 
questions, two more questions arise.  The first  is whether Long has kept his implied  contract with his 
reader.  In other words, despite his claim to literary license, Long also lays claim to empirical truth; 
therefore, has Long maintained  some sort of empirical fidelity?  Can we check Long’s stories ag ainst the 
facts of the outer land scape and  still find  them authentic? 
 It is easy to see that the stories of the “swinging nest” and  of “animal surgery” are on the outer 
edge of believability.  But in decid ing whether or not to assent, if we are to follow Booth’s gu ide, we must 
appeal to our personal experience.  In my personal experience I have never seen anything like the type of 
nest the orioles built, nor have I seen an animal perform the kind  of first -aid  that the woodcock is claimed  
to have performed.  But my own ornithological knowledge is slight.  And , as Frank Stewart notes: “When 
he attacked  Long’s oriole architects, Burroughs was aware of the bower birds of New Guinea and  of the 
weaver birds of Africa, both of which stitch and  weave strips of grass and  similar materials into 
structures far more elaborate than the nest reported ly made by William Long’s birds.”  Stewart also 
postu lates: “We might wonder what Burroughs would  have made of recent scientific reports of Capuchin 
monkeys seen treating their own wounds and  the wounds of their offspring with plant and  liquid  
materials, even manufacturing the tools w ith which to apply the treatments” (102).  
 So in order to evaluate our assent, or to confidently d issent, we first may need  to attain more 
knowledge about the natural world .  The Cree who assented  to the story of the wolverine d id  so from a 
place of expertise.  They had  hunted , trapped , and  observed  the wolverine just as had  the Nunamiut.  So 
we must also become aware of our natural surroundings.  We must learn the d ifference between a 
ponderosa and  a piñon p ine, we must notice the blue herons, the banded  kingfishers, or the Clark’s 
Nutcrackers that enter our lives as we go about our business--we must watch the subtleties in the 
behavior of the oriole that is outside our kitchen window. [6] 
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However, even with my limited  experience with birds, I am not willing to assent to Long.  His 
stories d o not fit my small experiences with wild  animals.  I have d ifficulty believing the story about the 
eagle coasting to his death, and  Long has other equally hard  to believe tales.  One example is of wolves 
snapping at the heart of a stag (Lutts 111).  I know enough about wolves to know that they are smarter 
than that.  They know that the best way to bring down prey is to bite where the deer is most vulnerable.  
A deer’s heart is protected  by ribs and  the wolves would  be unnecessarily risking their own lives to act so 
foolishly.  Some of Long’s stories may be true; but in my read ing, his more outrageous claims undercut  
his ethos and  permit me to d ismiss the lot. 
 However, I think there are still more criteria we can use to decide whether or not to assent.  We 
do not want to fall into the same trap as Burroughs when he demands such a literal accountability to 
reality that he criticizes William Cullen Bryant’s poetry, for example, for its lack of ornithological 
accuracy.  How can we make a literary assent less about bickering over very specific, d ifficult to verify 
facts, and  more about what type of world  these stories create?  That is, how can we deal with these stories 
in a way that is not too limited , but that in some way still attempts to have an accountability to the more -
than-human world?   
 In examining this question, I want to focus on environmental ethics.  I am co nscious that I am 
bringing contemporary ethical norms to bear on Long’s work, and  therefore risking anachronism.  
However, the contract Long establishes with his readers is reliant upon some type of empirical integrity 
and  is, therefore, similar to the con tract contemporary nature writers establish. 
 The key to this problem seems to be in Lopez’s emphasis on relationships.  In “Landscape and  
Narrative,” Lopez insists that it is the relationships the storyteller establishes between the various 
elements of the exterior landscape that determine whether or not a story “rings true.”  (66).  Lawrence 
Buell talks about the issue of representation and  Lopez’s theory.  He writes: 
Lopez’s notion of “outer mimesis” in environmental nonfiction seemingly boils d own to 
this.  Literature functions as science’s less systematic but more versatile complement.  
Both seek to make understandable a puzzling world .  To a greater degree than science, 
literature releases imagination’s free play, though the p lay is not entirely free, since the 
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imagination is regu lated  by encounters with the environment both personal and  exposed .  
Thus regu lated , the mind  is at leisure to ramble among intriguing hypotheses, and  it is 
not only permitted  but expected  to present theory as narrative or descriptive exposition 
rather than as argument (94). 
 The issue, then, seems to be not whether literature allows a p lace for the play of imagination, bu t 
to what degree that imagination can roam and  still be “regulated  by encounters with the environment.”  
So the narratives that we create about the natural world  are theories about the world  somewhat 
analogous to scientific theories.  But in narrative, the role of imagination is not just freer but also 
necessary for understand ing.  Both the scientific and  the na rrative attempt to make sense of the world  
around  us, but serve d ifferent purposes in doing so.  Furthermore, both are subject to revision by the 
outer landscape.  Science is one method  of attempting to understand  and  is very effective in addressing 
certain types of empirical and  quantitative questions.  Narrative, on the other hand , is an equally 
important method , and  often addresses questions of value, relationship, and  ethics.  Narrative must take 
into account what science can provide in terms of empirical and  quantitative understand ing.  Likewise, 
science must look to narrative to answer questions of values and  ethics.  One is not subord inate to the 
other; rather, there should  be a complimentary relationship.  Yet both must be checked  against the outer 
land scape. “The narrative makes no pretense of total accuracy;” Buell writes, “it is a theory of natural 
history; but nature is the court of appeal” (94).  If the stories of William Long do not pass such an appeal, 
we should  value them less because they have not kept the contract with the reader. 
 Kenneth Burke offers a term that is useful for such a d iscussion.  Any statement must be checked  
against what Burke calls the recalcitrance of reality.  In other words, our theories about reality eventually 
collide with the object world , and  the accuracy of our theories is always eventually checked  against such 
recalcitrance.  Burke writes: “‘I can safely jump from this high place’ may be a pseudo -statement.  ‘I can 
safely jump from this high place with the aid  of a  parachute’ might be the statement as revised  after one 
had  taken the recalcitrance of his material adequately into account” (255-56).  Burke advocates a continual 
revision with the potential not of getting it right, but of at least getting it better.  Lop ez seems to argue 
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that the recalcitrance of the outer landscape provides a corrective to our stories --both narrative and  
scientific. 
 Yet, because we cannot observe the birds outside Long’s kitchen wind ow ourselves, and  because 
many of us are not expert naturalists, the appeal to the object world  may be d ifficult.  If our choices are 
the response of the Cree (because of my experience, I think that could  happen) or the opposite (because of 
my experience, I don’t think that occurred), but we do not have exper ience with the wolverine, do we 
have other ways of gauging assent?   
 Besides d irect knowledge of the natural world , there is another consideration.  Lopez claims that 
the key d ifference between authentic and  inauthentic stories--or stories that provide valuable knowledge 
and  those that do not--is the relationships they establish.  Lopez’s claim implies that because we often 
read  or listen to these stories in order to understand  our relationship to the natural world , if we already 
have some understand ing of that relationship, we may be able to work backward  from the relationship 
these stories establish to the stories themselves.  We may ask: “What relationships are established  in 
Long’s account of the swinging nest and  the animal surgery, or in the hunter’s account of the wolverine?  
How are these relationships d ifferent? What are the ethical implications of these relationships?”   
 Let us return to Long’s stories.  One of the main accusations against Long is that he is 
anthropomorphizing these animals.  But is anthropomorphism always bad?  Long shows these orioles 
thinking ahead , working together, and  showing concern for the young that w ill soon inhabit their nest.  
The woodcock is cred ited  with the intelligence to know what to do when it has become injured .  By 
giving the animals some human qualities, he breaks down an assumed d ivision between the animal and  
human worlds.  It seems that by making them living, intelligent, sentient creatures, Long overcomes 
other more damaging notions of animals as little mach ines.  As noted  earlier, even Burroughs, who 
claims to have sympathy with the natural world , seems to buy into the notion of instinct in a way that 
turns animals into automatons.  Long’s anthropomorphizing creates a sympathy that could  lead  to a 
valu ing of these animals.  In this world  of head long human development, explod ing human population, 
and  habitat destruction, valuing of wild life is not a bad  thing.   
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 The relationships established  by Lopez’s wolverine story, however, are d ifferent in two ways.  
First, there is a definite d ivision in Long’s account between the observed  and  the observer.  Long’s 
account read s, not surprisingly, much like nineteenth -century ethnography.  The civilized  European 
observes some unbelievable facts and  brings them back to th e rational, intelligent Western world  in order 
to be evaluated .  He even claims to have artifacts from the observation.  “The nest hangs above my table 
now,” Long writes, “a reward  of a twenty-five years’ search” (692).  There is a definite hierarchy 
established  between the observer and  the observed . [7] 
Such a hierarchy does not exist in the story of the wolverine.  Although the wolverine is being 
hunted  by the man on the snow machine, there is a certain awareness and  reciprocity between the two.  
The man is in pursuit, but from the very moment he observes the wolverine, the wolverine is “pausing to 
look back.  The hunter was catching up,” writes Lopez, “but each time he came over a rise the wolverine 
was looking back from the next rise, just ou t of range” (62).  The wolverine was not merely being 
observed  by the hunter;  he was also observing the hunter.  He is looking back from each succeed ing rise 
and  finally jumps the man.  The hierarchy that exists in Long is not present in Lopez’s example.   
 As the man tops the next rise, the wolverine is bounding toward  him: “But before he could  pull 
his rifle from its scabbard , the wolverine flew across the engine cowl and  the wind shield , hitting him 
square in the chest.”  The wolverine in Lopez’s tale is also anthropomorphized  to some degree.  After the 
snow machine rolls over, he “fixes the man with a stare” and  then, without scratching or biting the man, 
simply walks away.  The wolverine is given a certain human -like consciousness.  We are led  to believe 
that his stare had  the same intent as would  a stare from a man after w inning a qu ick and  decisive victory 
in a tavern brawl.  This idea is emphasized  even further by the wolverine running, but instead  walking 
away from the beaten man.   
 However, the same advantages of anthropomorphism occur here without the problems.  There is 
a certain amount of sympathy created  for the wolverine just as there is for the orioles and  the woodcock.  
There is cred it given for intelligence and  ability to survive.  The line between the human and  the 
nonhuman is breached  here in useful ways and  in some similar ways to Long’s account.  But there is also 
a certain amount of reciprocity established  in the story of the wolverine, which is a result of a lack of 
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hierarchy.  The wolverine is an equal participant in the world .  Even though he is being hunted  by the 
man on the snow machine--a man whose economy depends on the wolverine--it is in some ways an equal 
match and , partly because of his dependence, the man respects the wolverine who has wo n this round .   
 We must also look at why the stories were related .  In the case of the swinging nest, it was to 
prove Long’s reliability as a naturalist.  The wolverine story was an attempt by Lopez to better 
understand  the more-than-human world .  It is d ifficult to ignore these facts when we gauge our assent.  
Yet, can there be inaccurate stories with authentic relationships? Accurate stories with inauthentic 
relationships? 
 The reality is that we are always in d anger of being duped .  In the final analysis, it is true that we 
read  nature writing not only for the facts themselves, but also for how those facts lead  us to see the world .  
So the relationship criteria can be usefu l in determining our assent to its ethical position.  Although it is 
possible to have inaccurate stories with accurate relationships, such as in fiction, if the writer claims to be 
writing nonfiction, the read er expects a certain fidelity to observation and  real experience. Furthermore, if 
we look to a piece of writing to tell us about our relationship to the more-than-human world , and  the 
writer shows little concern with the reality of that world , it is d ifficult to assent to her ethical claims.   
 In short, because we are being asked  to take an ethical position toward  the natural world , a writer 
has an obligation to portray that world  accurately.  However, we always risk assenting to an inaccurate 
story and  therefore an inaccurate ethic. So finally, to gauge our assent to the ethical position of a nature 
writer, we must go out into the world  ourselves.  We must gain some experience with the wolverine, or 
even with the birds in our own backyard .   
III 
 I want to now return to my original thesis: a rhetoric of assent is necessary when read ing nature 
writers because nature writers are imaginatively exploring how we humans can establish a more ethical 
relationship with the more-than-human world , and  any time we are confronted  with something that is so 
fundamentally opposed  to thousands of years of human history, we need  to abandon an initial doubt for 
an initial belief which will help us consider the possibilities being proposed .  Thus, even if we conclude 
that Long was indeed  a “faker,” we must initially assent to his ideas in order to evaluate them effectively.   
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 Finally, I want to return to the work of Lopez.   In his essay “Apologia” Lopez recounts a road  
trip  from his home along the McKenzie river in Oregon to a friend’s house in Ind iana. On his journey, he 
takes note of the large number of dead  animals along the road .  He sees black -tailed  jackrabbits lying 
“like welts of sod ,” and  a “crumpled  ad olescent porcupine” with “blood  flecked  teeth” (83).  He 
encounters dead  deer, badgers, snakes, raccoons and  “pronghorn antelope swollen big as barrels by the 
side of the road , their legs splayed  rigid ly aloft” (86).  He also broods over the lives he takes as he d rives.  
He is troubled  by the young gull that he strikes and  by the immature barn swallow that, despite his w ild  
attempt to avoid  the collision, “hangs by its head , motionless in the slats  of the grill” (86).  As he stops for 
the night at a motel he “finger -scrapes the d ry stiff carcasses of bumblebees, wasps, and  butterflies from 
the grill and  head light mountings”--the “aerial plankton.”  As he travels and  broods he stops at each 
casualty and  carries or d rags it from the road , placing it gently in the grass or depositing it carefully 
behind  a bush, away from the traffic.  When asked  by a man, “Why do you bother?” he responds, “You 
never know.  [ . . . ] The ones you give some semblance of burial, to whom you offer an apology, may 
have been like seers in a parallel cu lture.  It is an act of respect, a technique of awareness” (84).  
 Lopez is asking us to consider certain possibilities.  How does our view of animals change if we 
see them as “seers in a parallel culture?”  More importantly, Lopez seems to be attempting to redefine the 
trad itional relationships with the more-than-human.  He is asking us to develop techniques of awareness, 
to perform acts of respect and  enter into a reciprocal rela tionship, all of which seem to depend  initially 
upon assuming a rhetoric of assent.  While read ing Lopez, or other nature writers, we must consider how 
the world  is presented  to us and  if it fits our life experience; if it does, we must take a cue from the  Cree 
and  say: “That could  happen.”  
notes 
1. In 1999, I asked  Lopez about this incident.  I commented  on how the response of the Cree d idn’t say 
just anything could  happen, but came from their experience with wolverine. Lopez responded: “ [E]xactly.  
It has to be empirically grounded  in order to say that. They have to say, ‘I've watched  wolverine and  I am 
aware of the potential. And  given the potential, that could  happen’" (Sumner, “Nature Writing” 22).  
2. Lopez continues to develop his ideas about interior and  exterior landscape in “The Country of the 
Mind” in Arctic Dreams. 
3. In The Nature Fakers: Wildlife, Science and Sentiment , Ralph Lutts makes a thorough examination of this 
turn-of-the-century controversy. 
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4. In this essay, Burroughs ranks poets accord ing to their accuracy in depicting the natural world .  For 
example, Emerson is praised  for his knowledge of the “New England  Fields and  Wood s” while Bryant is 
taken to task for inaccurate ornithological detail. 
5. Interestingly, as Ralph H. Lutts points ou t, Theodore Roosevelt wrote Burroughs a private letter after 
the Atlantic article.  The letter contained  mostly praise for the article and  was the beginning of an alliance.  
“I was delighted  with your Atlantic article,” Roosevelt wrote to the naturalist.  “I have long wished  that 
something of the kind  should  be written.”  However, the president warned  Burroughs not to overp lay the 
role of animal instinct--Long’s first enumerated  complaint--but to allow “sufficiently for the 
extraord inary change made in the habits of the wild  animals by experience with man, especially 
experience continued  through generations!” (42). 
6. On the subject of authority, it is interesting to note that Theodore Roosevelt assembled  a panel of 
naturalists for this very purpose.  He was so concerned  that Long’s tales were being taken as fact that he 
gathered  the nation’s foremost naturalists and  then published  their results.  (See Edward  B. Clark’s “Real 
Naturalists on Nature Faking” in Everybody’s Magazine.  Sept. 1907: 423-430.) 
7. However, as mentioned  above, Long is a nineteenth -century writer and  we must take that fact into 
account.  Yet, there are nineteenth-century writers who do not establish an hierarchical ethos.  One who 
comes d irectly to mind  is Thoreau, especially in “Succession of Forest Trees.”  Here, Thoreau is the 
observer, but he is also the observed  (80).  Thoreau demonstrates the same type of reciprocity I find  in 
Lopez. 
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